Abstract: The effect of users’ heterogeneity in power status on decentralized governance of common pool resources is understudied. As power matters more when resources are scarce, the combined effect of power differences and resource scarcity on the success in sustainably and equitably governing common pool resources is to be studied. Successfully tackling appropriation challenges in self-governed irrigation systems depends on users’ compliance with rules and sanctioning mechanisms. Users are expected to differ in compliance and in their reaction to scarcity according to their power status. To test this, a field experiment was conducted in Tanzania with users of self-governed irrigation systems of whom a proxy measure for relative power status was obtained via a participatory ranking exercise. Compliance to equally sharing resource units is the norm even under scarcity. But upstream users with a high power status are more likely to shirk than those of low power status, especially under scarcity. Moreover, low power status users who shirk appropriate only slightly more than half of the resource units. Surprisingly, sanctioning by the downstream user does not often invoke rule compliance especially not when water is scarce and least among upstream users of low power status. Lastly, in times of scarcity, low power status downstream users are less likely to comply with sanctioning than others. Overall, low power status users act cautiously which affects their claim on resources.

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