Abstract: The U.S. public biomedical research system is renowned for its “peer-review” process that awards federal funds to meritorious research performers. Although Congressional appropriators do not earmark federal funds for biomedical research performers, I argue that they support allocations for those research fields that are most likely to benefit performers in their constituencies. Such disguised transfers mitigate the reputational penalties to appropriators of interfering with a merit-driven system. I use data on all peer reviewed grants by the National Institutes of Health during the years 1984 – 2003, and find that performers in the states of certain House appropriations committee members receive 5.9 – 10.3 percent more research funds as compared to unrepresented institutions. The returns to representation are concentrated in state universities and small businesses. Members support funding for the projects of represented research performers in fields in which they are relatively weak, and counteract the distributive effect of the peer review process.

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