Abstract: This paper deals with share contracts in small-scale export pineapple production in Ivory Coast. It relies on intensive fieldwork conducted in 2002-2003 in the village of Djimini-Koffikro, combining surveys and in-depth case studies. All landowners and tenants were interviewed. A techno-economic survey was conducted in parallel on 147 plots cultivated under owner-occupancy, fixed rent or share contracts. The case highlights the role share contracts play for small producers regarding a production characterized by high price volatility on the European market, high production costs, and strong labor and know-how requirements. The study reveals the diversity of contractual configurations regarding the same crop, at the same place and under the same local term (abougnon). From the actors' perspective, the analysis of contractual choices sheds light on (i) the role of disequilibria/imperfection in tenancy, labor and credit markets; (ii) the role of intra-family land rights; and (iii) the minor role of monitoring and enforcement. We show that the abougnon contract allows actors facing a variety of constraints to engage efficiently in the intensive pineapple production. However, in terms of equity, the abougnon contract appears to be quite ambivalent: on the one hand, it contributes to the tenants' accumulation and autonomization process; on the other hand, the disequilibria on the tenancy market allows landowners to take advantage of the tenants' investments and know-how.