Will the World Be Ever Governed? the Dynamics of a Global Constitutionalization Process

Eric Brousseau (EconomiX, University of Paris X)
Yves Schemeil (PACTE, IEP Grenoble & IUF)
Jerome Sgard (CERI, Sciences-Po)

Abstract: To manage their coordination needs, individuals may find beneficial to delegate the right to establish and enforce rules to ad hoc entities. We differentiate between weak (or private) and strong (or public) delegation. We then oppose rule-makers, or insiders, or dominant players, who can impose their rules, to peripheral actors who have insufficient incentives to settle on an alternate order. This opposition then helps formalizing the emergence of a constitutionalized liberal order, where equality of rights balances asymmetries between citizens. We then show how political orders and market integration have interacted over the course of history. We identify three constitutional phases within the modern Westphalian era. This allows us first, to analyze the present day, international “non-order”; characterized by the confusion between private and public actors, failing to implement a binding hierarchy of norms. We then derive four evolutionary scenarii of constitutionalization corresponding to contrasted degree of institutional integration and of equality of rights between individuals. We then formalize the political dynamic leading to a possible, future global constitution as a conflict between “progressive” actors and conservative ones who derive substantial private benefits from national state machineries.


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