Trust and Co2 Emissions: Cooperation on a Global Scale

Abstract : Although the effect of trust on local cooperation is well-documented, little is known about how trust influences global cooperation. Building on a large body of theoretical and experimental literature, we hypothesize that trust shared in a society may positively affect global cooperative behavior. We provide empirical evidence in the context of climate change that an increase in trust is associated with a larger reduction in CO2 emissions across countries, controlling for country fixed effects and a number of time-varying factors. As a falsification test, we estimate the relationship on an earlier period when there was no concern of man-made climate change (before the 1980s) and find no impact of trust on CO2 emissions during that period.

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Got (clean) Milk? Governance, Incentives, and Collective Action in Indian Dairy Cooperatives

Abstract : Much economic activity in developing countries takes place in groups whose members are associated through social networks. Group sales can connect small-scale producers to broader markets, but introduce opportunities for free-riding. We explore the effect of collective incentives on group production among rural Indian dairy cooperatives. In a randomized evaluation, we find village-level cooperatives can solve internal collective action problems to improve production quality. However, some village elites decline payments when they cannot control information dis- closure. Opting out reflects frictions in allocating surplus within a social network, and suggests some transparency-based efforts to limit elite capture may undermine policy goals.

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The Human Side of Cyber Property Rights: Theory and Evidence from Github

Abstract : Open access is a defining feature of cyberspace that challenges the conventional wisdom on property rights. This paper presents a case where property rights may lead to the failure of the commons in cyberspace. We consider a game theoretic model of competing creations in which a freelance creator decides whether to choose open access in the shadow of a threat of litigation from the copyright holder, and competition between open access and its proprietary alternative allows a continuum of users to choose between voluntary contributions or royalty payment. When individuals are heterogeneous in social preference, the model exhibits two distinct equilibria: a reproduction equilibrium and an original contribution equilibrium. Copyright law can dramatically change the set of equilibria. Enforcing authorized use without considerable limitations on the owner's exclusive rights may erode the original contribution equilibrium completely. The key predictions of the model are then tested and supported by data from Github. A takedown notice has a persistent negative effect on subsequent sharing, and repositories shared by foreign users attract fewer contributions as their home countries improve upon software piracy prevention. Our findings caution against a secure property rights system in cyberspace.

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