Liberty, Security, and Accountability: the Rise and Fall of Illiberal Democracies

Abstract : We study a model of the rise and fall of illiberal democracies. Voters value both liberty and economic security. In times of crisis, voters may prefer to elect an illiberal government that, by violating constitutional constraints, offers greater economic security but less liberty. However, violating these constraints allows the government to manipulate information, in turn reducing electoral accountability. We show how elements of liberal constitutions induce voters to elect illiberal governments that remain in power for inefficiently long---including forever. We derive insights into what makes constitutions stable against the rise of illiberal governments. We extend the model to allow for illiberal governments to overcome checks and balances and become autocracies. We show that stronger checks and balances are a double-edged sword: they slow down autocratization but may make it more likely. We discuss the empirical relevance of our theoretical framework and its connection to real world examples.

---

In the Shadows of Great Men: Leadership Turnovers and Power Dynamics in Autocracies

Abstract : Political leaders differ considerably in the degree to which they consolidate power, but what gives rise to these variations still remains under-theorized. This article studies how informal political constraints associated with leadership turnovers shape intra-elite power dynamics. We argue that aging leaders’ efforts to manage the succession problem create an important, yet impermanent check on the power of subsequent leaders. To test this argument, we use the massive text corpus of Google Ngram to develop a new quantitative measure of power for a global sample of autocratic regime leaders and elites between 1950 and 2019, and employ a research design that leverages within-leader variations in predecessors’ influence for identification. We show that incumbent leaders’ ability to consolidate power becomes more limited when operating in an environment where influential former leaders are present. Further analyses suggest that the presence of former leaders is most effective in reducing incumbents’ ability to unilaterally appoint or remove high-level military and civilian personnel. These findings have implications for our understanding of the dynamics of power-sharing and institutional change in autocracies.

---

Hobbesian Wars and Democracy

Abstract : Political authority produces civil peace because a functioning state monopolizes violence (Weber, 1994; Acemoglu et al. 2012). Hobbes argues that against the war of "all against all", the only guardian is a sovereign with unlimited power. In this paper, we turn Hobbes's argument on its head. In a very general setup, we show that a Hobbesian kingship is the ultimate cause of perpetual civil wars. The Hobbesian fight over the kingship can only be prevented by a unanimous democracy. An extended model demonstrates that the unanimous democracy is stabilized by a separation between the executive and the legislature. A majoritarian democracy can prevent Hobbesian wars through a separation between the executive and the judiciary, but only after socioeconomic modernization. Thus, the extended model explains how the separation of powers evolves over the modernization process and why pre-modern democracies embed much stronger veto power than modern democracies (Finer, 1997; Stasavage, 2020).

---

The Political Economy of Policy Experimentations in China

Abstract : Policy learning, often involving experimentations, is an essential component of government's decision making. In this project, we aim to describe and understand China's policy experimentations, which are speculated by many to have played a vital role in fostering China's reform and growth. We collect comprehensive data on policy experimentations conducted in China over the past 4 decades by 139 ministries and commissions. We document three main results. First, a substantial share of policy experimentations deviate from representative experimentation sites selection as they over-sample more developed jurisdictions. Second, while the observed deviation from representativeness cannot be justified by a range of models of optimal experimentation design, about half of such deviation can be attributed to misaligned incentives between the central and local governments. Third, deviation from representativeness results in implemented policies that systematically favor more developed regions, because the central government does not adjust for positive selection and discard irrelevant information when evaluating experimentation outcomes. Taken together, these results suggest that policy experimentations take place under various political and bureaucratic constraints, which could limit the scope and bias the direction of policy learning.

---