Reverse Revolving Doors: the Influence of Interest Groups on Legislative Voting

Miguel Alquézar-Yus (European University Institute)
Josep Amer-Mestre (European University Institute)

Abstract : Using the alphabetic allocation of seats in the European Parliament, we show that former employees of interest groups influence the voting behavior of their col- leagues when sitting together. When the subject of the vote is relevant to the interest group, the probability of the nearby colleagues of casting the same vote increases by 2.4% and that of abstention decreases by 9%, while no effect is detected for other vote subjects. These probabilities increase for votes about budgetary allocations and they are comparable to those of sitting beside party motion leaders. Revolving doors are problematic for the political process also when working in reverse.

Enforcement and Deterrence with Certain Detection: an Experiment in Water Conservation Policy

Oliver R. Browne (The Brattle Group)
Ludovica Gazze (University of Warwick)
Michael Greenstone (University of Chicago)
Olga Rostapshova (University of Chicago)

Abstract : New technologies are poised to transform regulatory enforcement by automating costly inspections and driving violation detection rates to 100%. We conduct a randomized field experiment to evaluate the adoption of smart meters for enforcing outdoor water-use regulations in a major US city facing water scarcity. We randomize 88,905 households into 12 groups varying enforcement method (automated or visual inspection) and fine levels. Automated enforcement decreases water use by 3% and violations by 17%. However, due to imperfect deterrence, fines increase by 13,800% and customer service calls increase by 545%, leading to backlash that might make maximum enforcement politically untenable.

Economic Concentration and Political Advocacy, 1999-2017

Nolan McCarty (Princeton University)
Sepehr Shahshahani (Fordham Law School)

Abstract : The growing concentration in markets raises important questions about the political power of large firms and concentrated industries. Indeed, many scholars and activists have sounded alarms about the dangers of monopoly for democracy and have called for reforming antitrust law to consider the political implications of greater market power. But to date, there has been little systematic evidence linking increased economic concentration to democratic harms in established democracies. This paper reports on the beginnings of our effort to fill this gap by exploring the correlation between the economic concentration of an industry and the lobbying expenditures of its firms. Linking lobbying data with industry-wide and firm-specific economic data, we investigate whether lobbying expenditures have become more concentrated over time and whether this concentration in the political market is associated with concentration in economic markets. We have two primary analyses. The first is an analysis of the correlates of lobbying-expenditure concentration. The second is a case study of six dominant firms in the information technology industry. Our preliminary results are mixed but do not suggest a strong relationship between the concentration of economic and political markets. We also outline the many additional avenues of inquiry opened up by our data that we are currently pursuing.