How Criminal Organizations Expand to Strong States: Migrant Exploitation and Political Brokerage in Northern Italy

Abstract : The widespread presence of criminal organizations in strong states presents a theoretical and empirical puzzle. How do criminal organizations — widely believed to thrive in weak states — expand to states with strong capacity? I argue that criminal groups expand where they can strike agreements with local actors for the provision of illegal resources they control, and that this practice is particularly profitable in strong states where using illegal resources is risky. Using a novel measure of organized crime presence, I show, first, that increases in demand for unskilled labor, and in criminals’ capacity to fill it by exploiting migrants allowed southern Italian mafias to expand to the north; and second, that mafia expansion gave a persistent electoral advantage to political parties collaborating with them. This suggests that criminal organizations should be reconceptualized not only as substitutes for weak states but also as complements to strong states.

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The Large Effects of a Small Win: How Past Rankings Shape the Behavior of Voters and Candidates

Abstract : Candidates’ placements in polls or past elections can be powerful coordination devices. Using a regression discontinuity design in French two-round elections, we show that candidates who place first by only a small margin in the first round are more likely to stay in the race, win, and win conditionally on staying in than those who come in a very close second. The impacts are even larger for ranking second instead of third, and also present for third instead of fourth. Rankings’ effects are largest when candidates have the same political orientation (making coordination more important), but remain strong when two candidates only qualify for the second round (and coordination is not needed). They stem from allied parties agreeing on which candidate should drop out, voters coordinating their choice, and the “bandwagon effect” of desiring to vote for the winner. We find similar results in two-round elections of 19 other countries.

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