Meritocracy in a Bureaucracy

Abstract : Bureaucracies often design rules and constrain discretion to avoid nepotism. Yet such rules may not be necessary in cases where the interests of the decision-maker and the bureaucracy are aligned. I examine discretionary promotions of junior Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) bureaucrats, in a setting where corruption and nepotism are viewed as the norm. I compile unique data on the abilities of junior officers, including both publicly available recruitment exam rank and information on job performance that is private to senior officials. Results show that seniors use both public and private information meritocratically in making these fast-track promotions. Despite no explicit incentives, seniors are equally meritocratic when choosing and promoting juniors for other teams as for their own teams. This is consistent with implicit incentives aligning incentives.

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Updating the State: Information Acquisition Costs and Public Benefit Delivery

Abstract : Delays in government to person payments limit their protective value. In a field experiment spanning the entirety of two Indian states, we randomized bureaucrats’ access to a mobile phone based e-management platform for India’s flagship workfare program. We randomized which levels of the administrative hierarchy received access to the app, called PayDash. PayDash provided real-time updates on the status of pending payments, identified responsible officers, and enabled immediate follow-up via WhatsApp and phone calls. We have three findings: first, processing times were reduced by 11% of the pre-intervention control mean in treatment areas, with gains concentrated in high payment delay areas. Second, we observe substitutability in providing PayDash at different levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy, suggesting reduced information frictions, not simply improved monitoring, underlie performance gains. Finally, officer transfers - a costly form of incentivizing bureaucrats - declined by 23% in treatment areas.

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