Family Rules: Nepotism in the Mexican Judiciary

Abstract : This paper studies the extent and causes of nepotism in the Mexican judiciary. On average, the arrival of a judge into a judicial circuit results in the hiring of 0.05 relatives to key court positions within the following year, a figure which is probably a lower bound of the overall effect. The observed nepotism is concentrated among judges who have been sanctioned for administrative offenses, which indicates that the hiring of relatives is motivated by rent-seeking rather than by efficiency purposes. Importantly for personnel policy, the effect is concentrated among judges who are assigned to courts located in their state of birth—where jobs might be closer to a wider family network— and among appeal judges—who may have access to larger institutional resources and face lower career incentives.

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Another Wind of Change? Evidence from Political Outsiders Within the French Parliament

Abstract : Dissatisfaction with political representation in established democracies goes hand in hand with a craze towards representatives coming from the "civil society" referred to as political outsiders. We explore whether their access to key political positions results in noticeable changes. Specifically, we investigate whether they differ in terms of ability and policy preferences from experienced politicians whose definition and measurement constitute empirical challenges. Our analysis relies on original data on the activity of over 1,000 members of the French Parliament (MPs) between 2012 and 2020. First, we compute a non-parametric multi-dimensional index measuring MPs' legislative activity. Results suggest that the activity of new MPs follows a learning curve and takes time to catch-up with experienced counterparts. However, sitting in Parliament for too long also has a negative impact on activity. Second, we define a new methodology that assesses differences in policy preferences between new and reelected MPs. Evidence reveals that (i) the dynamics of political parties explains much of the voting behavior differences between newly elected and reelected MPs, and that (ii) the voting behavior of new MPs depends strongly on the degree of competition that the MP faces in legislative elections.

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From Lapdogs to Watchdogs: Random Auditor Assignment and Municipal Fiscal Performance in Italy

Abstract : Monitoring is a common tool used to mitigate agency problems. Monitors themselves, however, may be biased or corrupt, in particular if they feel obliged to please the party that appoints them. In this paper, I evaluate whether shifting control over auditor assignments improves monitoring effectiveness and impacts outcomes of the audited party. In 2011, Italy switched from allowing mayors to appoint municipal auditors to a system of random assignment, to strengthen oversight and ensure the financial soundness of municipal budgets. My identification exploits the reform's staggered introduction across municipalities in a generalized difference-in-differences setting. I obtain three main findings. First, treated municipalities increase their net surpluses by 9\% and debt repayments by 8\%, in accordance with national government objectives. Second, the improvement is achieved through revenue-based consolidation, rather than by cutting expenditures. Third, treatment effects are significantly larger for municipalities that were more at risk of collusion before the reform, and for those that are matched to a more distant or less connected auditor. Taken together, these findings provide novel quantitative evidence on the importance of independence in auditing, and highlight the improvement in outcomes that may result from changes in the design of monitoring institutions.

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