Endogenous Parliamentarism
Abstract: What are the factors driving the choice of the form of government? To address this question, the paper presents a theoretical model of the choice of form of government. This rational-choice model includes a constitutional as well as a political stage and is in that sense similar to the model of Robinson and Torvik (2012). The main difference between the models is the reversed order of the constitutional and political stages. While the order of Robinson and Torvik (2012) is more suitable for constitutional change, starting with the constitutional stage as a first step makes the model more suitable for situations of constitutional choice. So far, it has been argued that higher income inequality makes a parliamentarian system less likely. In this article, the likelihood of a parliamentarian system changes with the level of income inequality, but the direction of that change depends on institutional details such as the composition of the constitutional assembly. This result is thereafter analysed using the case study of five former Soviet republics after the breakdown of the Soviet Union.
