Bargaining and Governance in Multiparty Presidential Regimes

Luis Araujo (Michigan State University)
Carlos Pereira (Michican State University)
Eric Raile (North Dakota State University)

Abstract: We develop a formal model of bargaining and exchange in multiparty presidential regimes that simultaneously considers political transfers, monetary transfers, and policy concessions. The two-party case of the United States serves as a benchmark in discussing exchange in presidential regimes, while the Brazilian regime serves as an exemplar of the multiparty case. The results of the modeling suggest that the executive is better off using political transfers in exchange for support from factions that are ideologically similar to the executive and better off using monetary transfers when obtaining support from more ideologically distant factions. The model also suggests that the optimal strategy for building a governing coalition depends on expectations about future bargaining conditions. We examine empirical evidence from a period of “normal” politics in Brazil under President Lula and from the more difficult first year of Lula’s presidency.


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