When Does Business Turn Violent? Elections and Business-related Violence in Russia, 1995-2010
Abstract: This paper examines the conditions that turn business violent. Few studies have been conducted that develop theories linking entrepreneurial activities and violence as well as engage micro-level data to test them. In countries where institutions providing political accountability and protection of property rights are weak, and at least some elite actors (for example, organized criminal groups) accept the use of violence as a tool in political and economic competition, entrepreneurs may find it worthwhile to run for office in order to secure privileged status. These privileges protect them from being physically attacked and their assets from being expropriated by competitors who, if elected, would control local executive and legislative institutions, as well as law enforcement system and courts. Due to these risks, businessmen-candidates may become exposed to competitive pressures resulting in violence during election years. To test whether provincial elections indeed cause spikes in commerce-motivated violence, this project relies on an original dataset of more than 6,000 attacks involving business interests in 74 regions of Russia, in 1991-2010. The results show that only legislative elections cause increases in violence while there is no evidence that executive polls have a similar effect.
