Institutionally Constrained Technology Adoption: Resolving the Longbow Puzzle

Abstract: For over a century the longbow reigned as undisputed king of medieval European missile weapons. Its superiority over the crossbow enabled small armies of archers and dismounted men-at-arms to consistently defeat larger armies of mounted knights and infantry. Yet only one nation used the longbow as a mainstay in its military arsenal: England. Despite suffering repeated defeats by the longbow, France and Scotland clung to the technologically inferior crossbow and complementary tactics. This “longbow puzzle” has perplexed historians for decades. Our paper resolves it by developing a theory of institutionally constrained military technology adoption. Unlike the crossbow, the longbow was cheap and easy to make, potentially enabling usurping nobles to organize rebellions against their rulers. Medieval rulers choosing between missile technologies thus confronted a tradeoff with respect to internal and external security. England alone in late-medieval Europe was sufficiently politically stable to allow its rulers the option of the first-best technology. In contrast, in France and Scotland political instability prevailed, constraining rulers in these nations to the crossbow. Historical evidence on political stability, missile-weapon reliance, and relative wealth across countries and over time supports our theory.