Examining Federal District Judges' Referrals to Magistrate Judges
Abstract: U.S. magistrate judges contribute much to the handling of federal litigation, yet they remain largely unstudied. This paper examines the deployment of magistrate judge resources by federal district judges. It begins by arguing that district courts select magistrate judges based on merit, and not ideology. The paper then uses a game-theoretic model to investigate the benefit district judges are likely to gain from referring to magistrate judges in civil cases (a) discovery and pretrial matters, (b) dispositive motions in comparatively non-ideological cases, and (c) dispositive motions in comparatively ideological cases. The model predicts that referring (i) discovery and pretrial matters and (ii) dispositive motions in comparatively non-ideological cases will always provide benefits to district judges. In comparison, the referral of dispositive motions in comparatively ideological cases will provide a benefit only where there is uncertainty as to whether the court of appeals’ and district judge’s ideological preferences will align. We should see more of the first two kinds of referrals. Also, ideology of the district judge should affect the frequency with which dispositive motions are referred in ideological cases.
