The Sorry Clause
Abstract: Apologies are used frequently in everyday interactions the world over to mitigate and resolve conflict situations. The pervasiveness of apology finds expression in many cultures, both highly developed modern ones and rather primitive ancient ones. In order to evaluate the usefulness and efficacy of apologies, it is illustrative to consider a counter-factual: A world in which everyone can choose their action with certainty. In this world, the legal system and other social governance mechanisms like standard grim trigger strategies and ostracism are very effective. In fact, they are so effective in deterring defection that this world does not need any ‘glue’ as nothing ever ‘breaks’. On the contrary, a world where players face uncertainty in choosing actions, undesirable outcomes cannot be avoided. Accidental defections caused by such uncertainty that does not depend on the level of care, require a mechanism to reconcile the players; to glue together what might be broken. This world, in so far as it more closely resembles the world we live in, requires an apology. This paper posits the existence of a ‘sorry equilibrium’ that relies on a costly apology for self-identification of accidental defection in a social dilemma. The outcomes of such an equilibrium are compared to those from other bilateral social governance mechanisms and formal legal systems. It is argued that with the possibility of accidental defections other social mechanisms are inadequate, while formal legal systems can generate perverse incentives.
