Unenforced Laws: a Field Experiment
Abstract: In this Article we examine and provide evidence of the self-enforcing potential of unenforced laws that assign passive rights. We conducted a novel experiment in a bar that operated a separate room where smoking was sometimes prohibited and allowed at other times. Because the smoking prohibition was never enforced in the separate room, non-smokers were at all times subjected to second-hand smoke there: the only difference was that sometimes smoking violated the smoking ban, while at other times it was permitted. As we manipulated the applicable smoking regime, an interesting finding emerged: although non-smokers in the room did not mind the second-hand-smoke, they reacted adversely to smoking only when a prohibition was in effect. Even though smoke concentrations were lower when smoking was prohibited, non-smoking customers left the bar earlier, consumed less and left smaller tips when the unenforced smoking ban was in effect compared to when smoking was allowed. Our findings illustrate the subtle but significant shifts in social dynamics that occur in the presence of unenforced laws. We show that, even in the absence of expressive effects, passive rights create a sense of ownership that induces a preference for compliance. In this process, citizens adversely experience infringements of rights regardless of the consequences of the infringing behavior itself. The findings challenge the conventional wisdom that effective laws require that there is wide public support for the policy objectives or, alternatively, that laws must be backed by public deterrence and enforcement.
