Judicial Laterals

Abstract: Just like lawyers in practice at one law firm sometimes “lateral” to another law firm, so too do judges in one judicial system (either the federal judiciary or a state judicial system) “lateral” to another judicial system (either a state judiciary or the federal judiciary). This paper examines the practice of “judicial lateraling.” It develops, and seeks to validate, five hypotheses. First, all else equal, judges will be more likely to move from a state judicial position to a position in the federal judiciary than vice versa. Second, judges who move from the federal judiciary to a state judiciary will be more likely to move to a position in the judicial hierarchy higher than the one they left (e.g., from a position as a federal trial judge to a position as a state appellate judge). Third, a judge who will be more likely to gain a “step up” in the judicial hierarchy when moving from the federal judiciary to a state judiciary than the other way. Fourth, the greater the professionalism of the state judiciary, the less likely it will be for a state judge to accept a step down in the judicial hierarchy when moving to the federal judicial system. Fifth, the greater the professionalism of the state judiciary, the less likely it will be for a state judge to lateral to the federal judiciary.