The Constitutionalization of American Direct Democracy? an Experimental Evaluation of Voters Attitudes Toward Constitutional Initiatives

Abstract: Over the past three decades, an increasing number of policy decisions have been made at the ballot box by citizens. While some of these proposals sought to modify existing statutes, Krislov & Katz 2008 document the rapidly growing number of proposals attempting to amend state constitutions—the highest level institutional form for the political subunit. Given the lack of a legislative filter, the growing constitutional flavor of American direct democracy raises fundamental questions about the signaling environment under which these semi-permanent institutional modifications are being considered. Specifically, does the distinction between constitutional and statutory ballot measures matter for individual voters as they render their voting decisions? We employ a laboratory experiment that manipulates the scope of the ballot measure and the formatting of the ballot, all the while keeping content constant. Our experiment represents a significant contribution to the extant literature as it clarifies the conditions under which individuals vote for certain types of ballot measures. Therefore, this article has important implications not only for ballot design, but also for our understanding of voter decision-making. In addition, we believe this study speaks to broader themes highlighted both by institutional scholars such as North (1990), Ostrom (1990) as well as the constitutional political economy literature (e.g. Brennan & Buchanan (1986), Buchanan & Tullock (1962)).