Recognition Incentives for Internal Crowdsourcing: a Field Experiment at Nasa

Jana Gallus (University of California, Los Angeles)
Olivia S. Jung (Harvard Business School)
Karim R. Lakhani (Harvard Business School)

Abstract: Internal crowdsourcing, a peer-based approach to innovation, has great potential for organizations. Yet, as we show, the tensions between organizational hierarchy and peer-based crowdsourcing can create barriers for employee engagement. In their search for incentives to overcome these barriers, should organizations use incentives that are congruent with their established hierarchical structures, or should they use incentives that are aligned with the aspirational, peer-based approach to innovation? We partnered with NASA for a qualitative study and a field experiment (N=7,455). First, we show that concerns about the legitimacy of platform engagement disincentivize employees. Second, we find that managerial recognition, the incentive that is congruent with the established hierarchy, significantly increases platform engagement. It does so by alleviating legitimacy concerns and by offering managerial attention. Peer recognition, which is congruent with the peer-based approach to innovation, is not found to have a significant overall effect. However, workers who are otherwise less visible were positively motivated by it.