When Deterrence Fails: How Improved Hassling Capabilities Produce Worse Outcomes
Abstract: I formalize interactions between an endogenously rising state and a rival, non-rising state that can accept the rising state’s rise, can go to war before the rise comes to fruition, or can degrade the rising state’s growth through low-level conflict operations that I call “hassling.” The novelty here is that the non-rising state has private information about their hassling capabilities; this implies that the rising state does not know how fast it can rise without invoking the non-rising state to hassle or go to war. I find that when the non-rising state is better able to conduct hassling, it can invoke problematic strategic responses in the rising actor, undermine the non-rising state's ability to use its private information productively, and result in lower utilities for the non-rising state. Empirically, this model provides insight into Saddam Hussein's decision making leading up to the 2003 U.S. invasion, and proxy-wars that occurred during the Cold War.
