Why Did Kings Summon Towns to Assemblies? a Theoretical Analysis

Abstract: This paper offers a novel theoretical explanation for the emergence of medieval assemblies. A king and two towns interact repeatedly. Each period, a public good project of uncertain quality requires funding. Each town privately observes a binary signal about the public good’s quality. King and towns all agree that the public good should be funded (resp. not funded) when both towns’ signals are positive (resp. negative). When signals are conflicting, the king wishes the project to be funded but the towns do not. The king can coercively extract contributions from the towns, unless it grants them autonomy, in which case contributions to the public good are voluntary. We first show that information aggregation cannot occur unless towns are granted autonomy. In an assembly, autonomous towns exchange information prior to choosing their contributions and play trigger strategies in which the public good receives funding whenever both towns are in favor. Alternatively, the king can approach towns sequentially, asking them to make publicly-observable contributions in the hope of triggering a cascade. Although he receives funding more often under sequential contributions than under an assembly, the king cannot rely on trigger strategies to discipline the first agent to be approached. As a result, sequential contributions are less likely to be feasible. This model sheds light on the evolution of national institutions triggered by towns’ administrative autonomy in 13th century England. In less than a century, English kings went from negotiating with towns sequentially to instead seeking their consent in representative assemblies. This modified the type of wars which received financing.