Economic Interests, Partisan Politics, and Environmental Polarization

Abstract: Focusing on environmental legislation since 1970s, this paper seeks to identify economic and political causes of party polarization in the US Congress. Three questions guide the analysis. First, why did environmental polarization emerge from initial bipartisanship? Second, why did Republicans become anti-environmental and Democrats pro-environmental? Third, what is the relative role of economic and party forces in explaining environmental polarization? The theoretical framework extends stochastic electoral competition models by incorporating new interest groups into political parties. The model allows us to explain the rise in environmental polarization, the role of interest groups in mitigating the effects of income on environmental voting, and the role of party in shaping votes. Our empirical analysis combine data on congressional environmental votes from 1971 to 2016 with data on legislator characteristics, congressional district economic and demographic information, and interest group contributions. The empirical analysis confirms that party polarization emerged over time from initial bipartisanship, but also finds evidence that economic forces play a role in environmental voting. More results.