A Theory of Power Structure and Institutional Compatibility: China Vs. Europe Revisited
Abstract: We synthesize two differences in the power structure of society between Imperial China and Premodern Europe: the Ruler’s absolute power was weaker in Europe, while in China the People were more comparable with the Elites regarding their power and rights. Why was a more symmetric Elite–People relationship compatible with a stronger, not weaker absolute power of the Ruler? We analyze a model of autocratic stability, where we read a stronger absolute power of the Ruler as conditioning more power and rights of the ruled on the Ruler’s will. We show that the stronger the absolute power, the more a more balanced Elite–People relationship will stabilize the autocratic rule, and the greater the Ruler’s incentive to promote such balance, thereby answering the question. Discussion and stylized facts support the theory’s relevance. The theory helps understand the relationship between components of inclusive institutions and the logic behind autocratic stability.
