The Costs of Top-down Control: Discretion and Departures Among Federal Prosecutors

Abstract: We study a policy during the Bush Administration intended to better control the day-to-day decisions of federal prosecutors, reducing their discretion and increasing the severity of sentencing. We present three main findings. First, using detailed biographical data on US Attorneys appointed by President Bush, we show that Senators' veto power influences how politicized (though not how qualified) the appointed US Attorney is. This shows that inter-branch and inter-party checks can keep expert bureaucracies apolitical. Second, using detailed administrative data from the Department of Justice's internal case monitoring database, we show that only the offices with politicized US Attorneys actually implemented the policy. This shows that managers' commitment is essential for enacting organization-wide reforms. Finally, we show these same offices saw a significant increase in the departure rate of front-line prosecutors following implementation. This shows that exercising political control over bureaucratic decisions entails a large personnel cost.