Csr As Contractarian Model of Multi-stakeholder Corporate Governance and the Game-theory of Its Implementation
Abstract: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is here defined as a multi-stakeholder model of corporate governance and fiduciary duties naturally emerging from a critical assessment of the incomplete contracts view of the firm. As far as the normative point of view is concerned, multi-stakeholder fiduciary duties are deduced from a theory of the firm’s stakeholders Social Contract. This provide for a clear cut and calculable objective function, a criterion for governance and strategic management no less able to set a bottom-line to the firm management than the profit maximization principle. As far as implementation of the normative model is concerned, four roles of voluntary but explicit CSR norms are presented in terms of a non-cooperative game theory of implementation. It is shown that they allow • the description of equilibria, even if multiple, in a game played under unforeseen contingencies. • the ex ante selection of the equilibrium point that meets the requirements of an impartial choice. • to calculate conformist psychological equilibria, and the quite surprisingly result that mixed strategy equilibria are absent in the repeated Trust Game. • to provide an equilibrium selection mechanism that generates a state of mutually consistent expectations converging on the psychological equilibrium fully consistent with the norm
