A Theory of Colonial Governance
Abstract: This paper presents a simple model of elite formation emanating from a coloniser's quest to maximise extracted output from it's colonies. Under alternative specifications of the production function, the results of the model suggests multiple equilibria associated with varying combinations of elite dimension and human capital transfers that maximise the coloniser's objective function, depending on both the technology of governance chosen by the coloniser, as well as on the parameterisation of the productivity distance between elites and the population masses and on the returns to human capital. Under an additively separable production function, these equilibria range from (1) high human capital transfers to a fairly large elite under a governance technology by numbers, to (2) either high or low human capital transfers to a fairly large elite under a governance technology by quality, to (3) high human capital transfers to a relatively small elite or low human capital transfers to either a fairly small or large elite under a composite governance technology. This insight is useful in understanding why the pace of, and the approaches to decolonisation might have varied considerably across colonial experiences.
