Eco-regional Biodiversity Cartels on the Genetic Resource Market: the Andean Community's Response to the Convention on Biological Diversity
Abstract: The United Nations' Convention on Biological Diversity raised expectations of high benefits in genetic resource trade. As a reaction the megadiverse countries of the Andean Community (CAN) passed strict community access legislation. Against this background the main objective is to investigate whether public eco-regional biodiversity cartels of megadiverse countries on the genetic resource market can increase the appropriable benefits from biodiversity. We analyse how cartel design affects cartel benefits and discuss the benefit distribution among cartel members. The CAN biodiversity collusion serves as a case study. Our main finding is that cartels--contrary to their negative connotation--are potentially able to stimulate genetic resource trade and increase the appropriable benefits from biodiversity. This depends largely on the cartel design and the ability to attract bioprospecting agents. A member's benefit share rises in the member's relative biodiversity richness and even more in the quality of the institutional environment. The CAN collusion nullifies its market power by a deterringly overly strict access regulation and a lack of internal cooperation.
