Cooperation and Identity in a Multiethnic Society

Abstract: Sustaining cooperation in highly fragmented groups is an issue of major concern for modern societies. Whereas increased migration magnifies the economic relevance of the problem, the causes for the public goods underprovision remain largely untapped. We experimentally study cooperation among natives and migrants in a laboratory Public Goods Game with and without punishment. Participants were recruited from the general public and roughly half of the participants in each session were migrants. We varied our study along two dimensions: group composition and information about group composition. We find that homogeneous groups cooperate more than mixed groups with natives cooperating more than migrants under both conditions. Interestingly enough, differences between homogeneous and mixed groups, as well as natives and migrants, vanish as soon as no information about the group composition is provided. The data suggest substantial differences in norms of punishment between the two samples and the difference seems to be robust to variations in both information modes and group composition.